








WTO's impact on GDPR's Cross-Border 
Data Flows: ensuring the balance between 





With the rapidly developing technological developments, data has become a very 
important trade service unit, while the World Trade Organization (WTO) has been 
insufficient so far in the regulations on this matter. The fact that data also contains 
personal information makes WTO unreliable for the European Union (EU), which 
recognizes privacy and private life as a fundamental right, which pushes the EU to insist 
on its own data protection law in cross-border data transfers. 
In this article, we will question the role of the WTO obligations and principles on the 
EU's General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and trade-restrictive data localization 
measures, and examine whether GDPR can justify itself with the GATS’ General 
Exceptions Article XIV. Finally, we will conclude our work with recommendations and 





International trade allows countries to expand their markets for goods and services that 
are not available domestically or available at a higher cost. However, the development 
of world trade and economies can only be possible by providing an environment of 
trust. Providing this environment of confidence is only possible with the set of rules of a 
multinational level organization.  
The World Trade Organization (hereinafter referred to as WTO) is the only global 
international organization that deals with trade rules between countries. The primary 
purpose of the WTO is to open trade for the benefit of the all member nations, try to 
solve the trade problems they face with each other and help producers of goods and 
services, exporters and importers carry out their business.1  
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1  World Trade Organization: About WTO. https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/whatis_e.htm (last 
visited 14.05.2020) 
ASLI ALKIŞ 
   
 
6 
With the rapidly developing technology, the internet age has created the digital economy 
According to UNCTAD Digital Economy Report 2019, digitally available service exports 
amounted to $ 2.9 trillion, or in other words 50 percent of global service exports in 2018.2 So 
the data, the smallest unit for the implementation of the digital economy, has become very 
important in functioning international digital trade. Therefore, the international free flow of 
data is very important considering WTO's open trade purpose.  
However, the cross-border data flow is usually restricted by the nations protecting goals 
such as privacy and cybersecurity. Laws and regulations obstructing data flows across 
borders (“data restrictive measures” or “data restrictions”) are also often trade-restrictive, 
and therefore, some of these measures can violate WTO obligations.3 
Countries justify these measures under exceptions to international trade agreements that 
allow governments to implement the necessary measures to achieve their domestic policy 
goals, possibly including local internet stability and security policies.4 However, the 
absence of multinational cross-border data flow regulations causes uncertainty and 
instability for the countries, especially the developing countries, that transfer data to third 
countries. 
While the WTO implicitly governs the cross-border data flows through its General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (hereinafter referred to as GATS), countries are trying to 
protect their data privacy and cybersecurity with data localization laws and bilateral 
agreements5 (e.g. EU-US Privacy Shield6). 
Data localization is a policy whereby national governments compel internet content 
hosts to store data about internet users in their country on servers located within the 
jurisdiction of that national government (localized data hosting).7  In this regard, the 
adequate level test for transferring data to third countries of the EU's General Data 
Protection Regulation8 (hereinafter referred to as GDPR) is also considered as data 
localization.9 
In this paper, we will firstly examine the role of the GATS rules in data localization 
measures of the GDPR and discuss if the adequate level basis can be an exception on 
the privacy and personal data protection under the GATS. We will question if the WTO 
                                                           
2  United Nations Conference On Trade And Development (UNCTAD): Digital Economy Report 2019. 
United Nations Publications, 2019, p. 6.  
3  MITCELL, ANDREW D. – MISHRA, NEHA: Regulating Cross-Border Data Flows in a Data-Driven World: 
How WTO Law Can Contribute. Journal of International Economic Law, 22(3) 2019, p. 389. 
4  MITCELL – MISHRA 2019, p. 390. 
5  AARONSON, SUSAN ARIEL – LEBLOND, PATRICK: Another digital divide: the rise of data realms and its 
implications for the WTO. Journal of International Economic Law 21(2) 2018, p. 248. 
6  Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2016/1250 of 12 July 2016 pursuant to Directive 95/46/EC of 
the European Parliament and of the Council on the adequacy of the protection provided by the EU-U.S. 
Privacy Shield, OJ L 2017, 12.07.2016, pp. 1–112. 
7  SELBY, JOHN: Data localization laws: trade barriers or legitimate responses to cybersecurity risks, or 
both? International Journal of Law and Information Technology 25(3) 2017, p. 214. 
8  Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the 
protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of 
such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) (Text with EEA 
relevance) OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, pp. 1–88. 
9  BLUME, JOSHUA D.: Reading the Trade Tea Leaves: A Comparative Analysis of Potential United States WTO-
GATS Claims against Privacy, Localization, and Cybersecurity Laws. Geo. J. Int'l L. 49 2018, pp. 821–824. 
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rules are sufficient to ensure transnational cross-border data flows safely. Finally, we 
will conclude with our assessments and recommendations for improving WTO rules to 
prevent unfair data localization and providing an open trade environment. 
 
 
2. The role of the GATS in data localization measures of the GDPR 
 
In the natural flow of life, EU institutions and bodies or other legal persons and data 
controllers may need to transfer personal data to recipients outside the EU. According to 
Article 45 of the GDPR, a transfer of personal data to a third country or an international 
organisation may take place where the Commission has decided that the third country 
ensures an adequate level of protection.10  
 At any time, the European Parliament and the Council may request the European 
Commission (hereinafter EC) to maintain, amend or withdraw the adequacy decision on 
the grounds that its act exceeds the implementing powers provided for in the regulation. 
The effect of such a decision is that personal data can flow from the EU to that third 
country without any further safeguard being necessary. In other words, transfers to the 
country in question will be assimilated to intra-EU transmissions of data.11 
However, only 13 countries namely Andorra, Argentina, Canada (commercial 
organisations), Faroe Islands, Guernsey, Israel, Isle of Man, Japan, Jersey, New Zealand, 
Switzerland, Uruguay and the United States of America (limited to the Privacy Shield 
framework) has been so far recognised by the EC as providing adequate protection.12 
Considering this fact, it can be argued whether other member countries of the WTO 
are exposed to discrimination in the EU's data market and we will see below if the 
adequacy decisions of the GDPR violate the GATS rules that support open global trade.  
 
2. 1. Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment 
 
The GATS Article II requires that if a country allows foreign competition in one 
sector, equal opportunities should be provided to service providers from all other WTO 
members in this sector. This is true even if the country has not made a special 
commitment to ensure that foreign companies have access to their markets under the 
WTO. In brief, Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment (hereinafter MFN) means treating 
one’s trading partners equally on the principle of non-discrimination.13 MFN principle 
serves to create trust environment.  
                                                           
10  GDPR, Article 45(1)  
11  Adequacy Decisions, https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-topic/data-protection/international-dimension-data-
protection/adequacy-decisions_en (20.02.2020) 
12  https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-topic/data-protection/international-dimension-data-protection/adequacy-
decisions_en (last visited 25.11.2020) 
13  General Agreement On Trade In Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World 
Trade Organization, Annex 1B, 1869 U.N.T.S. 183, 33 I.L.M. 1167 (1994), Article 2 and WTO, Services: 
rules for growth and investment, https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm6_e.htm (last 
visited 16.05.2020) 
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GDPR's adequacy decision only for some countries could violate EU's MFN 
obligation, but it is argued as data transfer can continue with Articles 46 and 49 even in 
the absence of the adequacy decision, because the adequacy decision is not the only 
solution for cross-border data flow.14 Nevertheless, this adequacy test creates 
discrimination against the developing and less developed countries since they do not have 
sufficient equipment and protection systems. Because reaching the level of competence that 
the EU is looking for and being in this market would cost them a lot.15 
Developing countries, the rule-takers, lack the comparative advantage in the data-
driven sectors and this system makes the developed countries like EU, USA, China the 
rule-makers.16 
To ensure equal opportunities in terms of cross-border data transfers, there should be a 
multinational framework that requires developed countries to help developing and less 
developed countries to participate in the digital economy, including the mandatory assistance 
to develop their infrastructure regulators. Although such a comprehensive framework 
requires greater participation, goodwill, and commitment to countries, we believe that this 
solution will be more meaningful, relevant, and sustainable at the end of the day.17 
 
2. 2. National Treatment and Market Access  
 
GATS Article XVII, the National Treatment principle, ensures non-discrimination 
between foreign and domestic services and service suppliers in the sectors inscribed in 
the Member’s own Schedule.18 A Member wishing to maintain any limitations on 
National Treatment — that is any measures which result in less-favourable treatment of 
foreign services or service suppliers — must indicate these limitations in the third 
column of its schedule.19 
It is particularly worth mentioning that the National Treatment obligation, which is a 
general obligation under the GATT, is in contrast under the GATS only a specific one 
that needs to be explicitly committed to by the WTO Member.20 
This difference between GATT and GATS is arising from the different techniques of 
writing the commitments lists. When using a positive list as GATS does, a Party has to 
explicitly (“positively”) list those sectors and subsectors in which it undertakes Market 
Access and National Treatment commitments. As a second step, the Party lists all 
                                                           
14  VELLI, FEDERICA: The Issue of Data Protection in EU Trade Commitments: Cross-border Data Transfers in 
GATS and Bilateral Free Trade Agreements. European papers: a journal on law and integration 4(3) 2019, p. 
885. 
15  VELLI 2019, p. 889.  
16  AARONSON – LEBLOND 2018, p. 271. 
17  MITCELL – MISHRA 2019, p. 416. 
18  GATS XVII and WTO ECAMPUS: The National Treatment Principle. https://www.youtube.com/ 
watch?v=y1DW-xPGgdI (last visited 18.05.2020) 
19  Guide to reading the GATS schedules of specific commitments and the list of article II (MFN) exemptions, 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/guide1_e.htm (last visited 18.05.2020) 
20  WEBER, ROLF H.: Regulatory Autonomy and Privacy Standards under the GATS. Asian J. WTO & Int'l 
Health L & Pol'y, 7(25) 2012, p. 28. 
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exceptions or conditions to these commitments, stating the Market Access and/or National 
Treatment limitations it wants to apply.21 
When using a negative list as GATT does, the Parties do not have to list the sectors 
for which they take commitments. All sectors or sub-sectors that are not listed are, by 
default, open to foreign service suppliers under the same conditions as for domestic 
service suppliers. The Parties list only those sectors or subsectors which they limit or 
exclude by inscribing reservations for all measures which they consider would run 
counter to the Market Access and National Treatment principles.22  
For instance, Hungary requires in the European Union Schedule of Specific 
Commitments GATS/SC/157 under the Financial Services Sector that the transfer of 
information containing personal data, bank secret, securities secret and/or business 
secret is not allowed. With this limitation, no Member can accuse Hungary by violating 
National Treatment principle regarding this sector.23  
For this reason, Members that are particularly committed to the National Treatment 
obligation should be equal between domestic and foreign service and should not impose 
trade barriers. Hence, whether the GDPR adequacy test violates the National Treatment 
principle should be examined individually according to each concrete and current case.24 
According to GATS Article XVI, Market Access provision, if a country lists a 
particular sector on its Schedule of Specific Commitments, that country must provide 
access to foreign supplies of that particular sector to its market. This also requires that 
WTO members provide foreign suppliers treatment "no less favourable" than provided 
to domestic suppliers.25 
Slovak Republic requires license in the European Union Schedule of Specific 
Commitments GATS/SC/157 under the Data Processing Services Sector that for 
commercial presences and with regard to on-line information and/or data processing 
(including transaction processing).26 With this limitation on Market Access provision, 
Slovak Republic is exempted from non-discrimination obligation.  
Therefore, for the GDPR’s adequacy decision, we should question the EU Member 
States according to their specific commitments on the trade in services to conclude 
whether the decision is discriminative or favourable.  
 
2. 3. Article XIV(c)(ii) exception on the privacy and personal data protection  
 
If privacy standards are too high in one country, a problem may arise when a service 
provider from another country with lower privacy standards cannot easily deliver 
financial services or health services without agreeing to incur significant additional 
                                                           
21  WEBER 2012, p. 28. 
22  WEBER 2012, p. 28. 
23  For further information: WTO, European Union Schedule of specific commitments GATS/SC/157, 07.05.2019, p. 
1–200, https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/FE_S_S009-DP.aspx?language=E&CatalogueIdList=253942, 
31391,10335,2244,15832,33570,37471,26509&CurrentCatalogueIdIndex=0&FullTextHash=&HasEnglishRecord=T
rue&HasFrenchRecord=True&HasSpanishRecord=True (last visited 19.05.2020) 
24 VELLI 2019, p. 887.  
25  BLUME 2018, pp. 808–809. 
26  GATS/SC/157, p. 61. 
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costs to improve the level of data protection. Therefore, the first point to always look at 
is the scope of national commitments related to market access. Because confidentiality 
issues cause controversy only when in principle a commitment to grant access to the 
market. For example, if a country with high privacy standards has made an entry into 
the Market Access column of the National Commitment List Sub-Sector as “none” 
(meaning no restriction) for the cross-border supply, that country has committed to 
providing full market access in that Sub-Sector.27 
From the perspective of international trade law, GDPR's cross-border data flow 
provisions may violate the EU's non-discriminatory commitments under the GATS. At 
this point, the GATS contains an exception to privacy and protection of personal data 
under Article XIV (c) (ii). However, there is a risk that EU's potential violations may 
not be justified under this exception. Because the GDPR's adequacy approach is 
difficult to pass the “necessity test” of the exception.28 As it was ruled by the Appellate 
Body in the US Gambling case, it is necessary for a member country to prove that they 
have no other “reasonably available” alternative and that the measures have been taken 
because they are “necessary”.29 
 Besides, according to GATS Article VI, the measures, technical standards, and 
licensing requirements of countries regarding their qualification requirements and 
procedures should not be more burdensome than necessary to ensure service quality and 
should not create unnecessary barriers to service trade.30   
The GATS requires all regulations inconsistent with it to be least restrictive in terms of 
trade. In this case, it can be claimed that the adequacy approach is not "least trade-
restrictive". For example, GDPR may encounter an argument about the available 
alternatives that practised in Canada and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC).31 
CBPR is based on data protection principles that provide a basic standard in the 
APEC Framework. The APEC Framework is not as comprehensive or prescriptive as 
GDPR. APEC requirements are essentially a regional data protection standard that 
provides minimum protection, whereas GDPR is a regulation that requires a high level 
of protection, which is directly applicable in the EU.32 
In these circumstances, it does not seem like an appropriate solution for WTO to 
leave this important privacy issue, which concerns not only the service providers in the 
sending countries but also the users of the service, to the countries’ own decisions 
through bilateral agreements and domestic regulations.33 
                                                           
27  WEBER 2012, p. 32. 
28  YAKOVLEVA, SVETLANA – IRION, KRISTINA: Toward Compatibility of the EU Trade Policy with the 
General Data Protection Regulation. AJIL Unbound 114 2020, p. 11. 
29  United States – Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services (DS285), 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/1pagesum_e/ds285sum_e.pdf, (last visited 25.05.2020) 
retrived in HODSON, SUSANNAH: Applying WTO and FTA Disciplines to Data Localization Measures. World 
Trade Review 18.4, 2019. p. 16. 
30  GATS Article VI (4) and VI(4)(b) 
31  YAKOVLEVA – IRION 2020, pp. 1–12. 
32 SULLIVAN, CLARE: EU GDPR or APEC CBPR? A comparative analysis of the approach of the EU and 
APEC to cross border data transfers and protection of personal data in the IoT era. Computer Law & 
Security Review 35(4) 2019, p. 383. 
33  VELLI 2019, p. 894.  
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3. Conclusion  
 
As stated in the Digital Economy Report of UNCTAD in 2019, 50% of the service trade 
is provided by internet-connected technologies. In this case, since it is necessary to 
facilitate data flows in order to support continuous growth in digital commerce, ways to 
eliminate the barriers and data localization rules set by the countries are sought. 
However, facilitating this data flow should apply only to non-personal data. Because 
personal data is a human right protected by Article 8 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights, and the right to privacy should be protected by an agreed framework 
that would satisfy the EU and other member countries, not at minimum standards. 
Because it should not be forgotten that personal data is not only a commercial tool but 
also intimate information about private life. 
In this article, we discussed the role of WTO rules and principles on GDPR’s data 
localization measures and questioned how effective the MFN, National Treatment and 
Market Access principles are. We also investigated whether an adequate level test of 
GDPR could be an exception under GATS. 
In terms of the MFN principle, we can say that the GDPR’s adequacy test is not 
advantageous for the developing and less developed countries but it still ensures a level 
playing field since all third countries play by the same set of rules. Therefore, one 
cannot claim the EU by being unfair although each player does not have an equal 
chance of succeeding. 
However, in terms of global trade, it would be appropriate to create a multinational 
framework that provides compulsory assistance to develop infrastructure regulators for 
developing countries by developed countries. Although such a comprehensive 
framework brings more participation and responsibility to countries, we believe this 
solution is stable and meaningful, as we mentioned earlier. 
When it comes to National Treatment and Market Access principles, the parties can 
write their commitments and exceptions in two different techniques using a positive list 
or a negative list in their charts.34 As several scholars agreed, it would be a better 
solution for the GATS to change the style of commitments schedule from positive list to 
negative list as GATT does.35 
While these differences between positive and negative listing may seem trivial, they 
are not especially for internet and high-tech companies. The main difference is that the 
positive list approach discriminates against new products and services that are not 
protected under previous commitments. Due to the instability of international trade 
rules, it is not clear that new products have the same status as products such as 
telephones, fax machines and keyboards.36 
                                                           
34  EC: Services and investment in EU trade deals Using 'positive' and 'negative' lists, Trade 2016, p. 3. 
available at: https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/april/tradoc_154427.pdf ( last visited 25.05.2020) 
35  SEN NIVEDITA: Understanding the Role of the WTO in International Data Flows: Taking the Liberalization or the 
Regulatory Autonomy Path? Journal of International Economic Law. 2018 Jun 1., 21(2) pp., 323–48.,  p. 346. 
36  O’CONNNOR, DANIEL: When A Negative Is Positive: Updating International Trade Agreements for the 21st 
Century, 2012, available at: http://www.project-disco.org/21st-century-trade/when-a-negative-is-positive-
updating-international-trade-agreements-for-the-21st-century/, (last visited 25.05.2020) 
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When we get to the general exceptions of the GATS, we see that the new GDPR and 
the EU are trying to create a new foundation that can change the interpretation of GATS 
commitments for data transfers forever. The EU has long been considered the pioneer of 
privacy protections for data holders, but comments by EU officials as well as many 
other academics, professionals and other researchers suggest that the GDPR's GATS 
Article XIV (general exceptions) defence does not seem in place according to the US 
Gambling ruling concerning the necessity test as we examined in the above part.37  
From this viewpoint, WTO, the leading multilateral trading institution, is positioned to 
undertake many of the reforms needed to achieve a better balance between promoting the 
free flow of data while addressing the commercial interests of consumers and businesses 
while maintaining a safe and stable regulatory environment for data. However, WTO 
cannot deal with any issues related to data transfer or act on its own. Instead, the WTO 
needs to reshape its policy approach to engage with more relevant and knowledgeable 
international and multi-stakeholder institutions and to develop disciplines that address the 
relevant dimensions of data organization.38 For example, it may consult with the 
authorized and specialized units of the EC on data protection and get advice. 
The EU's data protection law and privacy approach may seem too strict or formal for 
other WTO countries. However, no one can interfere with the data protection approach 
of the Union's internal affairs. Each country will strike a different balance between the 
liberalization of digital trade and other non-trade policy priorities, reflecting its 
constitutional traditions, digital and economic development level, and the desire to 
endure digital colonialism.39 However, when it is a matter of cross-border data flows, a 
multinational solution should be found to balance both the privacy and economic concerns 
of the countries. 
We hope this study encourages WTO authorities to create a multilateral agreement 
that better ensures the place and importance of protecting personal data in international 
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37 BLUME 2018, p. 842. 
38 MITCELL – MISHRA 2019, p. 416. 
39 YAKOVLEVA – IRION 2020, p. 14. 
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A WTO HATÁSA A GDPR HATÁROKON ÁTNYÚLÓ 
ADATÁRAMLÁSÁRA: A MAGÁNÉLET ÉS A KERESKEDELEM 





A gyors technológiai fejlődésnek köszönhetően az adatok nagyon fontos kereskedelmi 
szolgáltatási egységgé váltak, azonban a Kereskedelmi Világszervezet (WTO) szintjén 
mindezidáig nem született erre a kérdésre vonatkozóan megfelelő szabályozás. Ez a tény, 
és az, hogy az adatok személyes információkat is tartalmaznak, megbízhatatlanná teszi a 
WTO-t az Európai Unió (EU) számára, amely tiszteletben tartja a magánéletet és alapvető 
jogként ismeri el a magánélethez való jogot. Mindez arra készteti az EU-t, hogy saját 
adatvédelmi szabályaihoz ragaszkodjon a határokon átnyúló adattovábbítás során. 
A tanulmány célja, hogy megvizsgálja a WTO kötelezettségeinek és alapelveinek az 
EU általános adatvédelmi rendeletével (GDPR) és a kereskedelmet korlátozó adatok 
helymeghatározási intézkedéseivel kapcsolatos összhangját, és azt, hogy a GDPR 
igazolhatja-e a GATS általános kivételeinek XIV. Cikkét. A tanulmány a fennálló helyzet 
értékelésével és a megoldásra irányuló ajánlásokkal zárul a nemzetközi szintű végrehajtás 
javítása érdekében. 
 
